Gunboat Diplomacy

In the Brodeur family papers, one group of documents details part of Victor G. Brodeur’s career that is not well known. The report he wrote to the Naval Secretary in 1932 regarding the events in El Salvador and the role of the Canadian Navy there was designated secret and held in Canada’s National Archives until 1980. The necessity for the report being secret is that it narrates the events of the revolution in that country.

To contextualize Brodeur’s role in El Salvador during the revolution, some historical background is helpful. El Salvador’s main export that was of value to the outside world is coffee and remains so to this day. The plantations were largely owned and managed by British and American business interests. Their investment helped bankroll the economic activities of the country. The Depression of the 1930s drove world coffee prices down and left workers in El Salvador unemployed or with lower wages. Plantation workers did not make a living wage even before then, so poor economic conditions contributed to unrest. British investors owned the railways that transported passengers and cargo. The only real investment in El Salvador that Canada could claim was the Montreal-owned International Power Company supplying electricity to the capital, San Salvador.

El Salvador was stable for fifty years before the insurrection of 1932. The chaos began when President Pio Romero Bosque introduced democracy in 1931. He refused to fix the election – a departure from custom that did not provide a clear majority. The congress appointed Miguel Angel Araujo as Bosque’s successor. When Araujo did not deliver on promised economic reforms, the workers revolted. In response, the army led a military coup and on December 2, 1931, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez, former vice president, took charge. He refused to allow elected Communist municipal officials to take office and arranged mass executions of his opponents. Opponents included rebels and Communist organizers violently protesting mass unemployment and poor conditions for coffee plantation workers.

Canadian External Affairs officials received a dispatch from the British Foreign Office on December 9, 1931, outlining the political situation in El Salvador and concerns regarding the safety of British lives and property there. The Foreign Office had reports that Martinez had the people’s support but that some sections of the army were discontented and could not be relied on to quell a Communist insurrection. By January 19, 1932 External Affairs received another report stating much the same, but also that the President was perceived as weak and there was disloyalty among high officials. There was nothing clear-cut about this situation.

The leader of the opposition forces, Farabundo Marti, lived in San Salvador and the insurrection was planned from this location. On January 22, 1932, Native Salvadorans and peasants marched on El Salvador’s western provinces. Marti was arrested, jailed and eventually executed. Worker dissatisfaction and Communist ideologues joined forces for the rebellion. A state of martial law was declared and panic broke out amongst landowners, managers, and railway officials. In this atmosphere, British and American governments were afraid their citizens and business interests were among the rebels’ targets in this conflict.

Behind the scenes on January 22, British authorities alerted the Canadian government to the political situation in El Salvador hoping Canada might assist in protecting British lives and property. The Commander-in-Chief of America and the West Indies Squadron, Admiral Sir H.V. Haggard of Bermuda, advised Walter Hose, Chief of Naval Staff, that in the current situation in El Salvador, the cruiser HMS DRAGON was five days away. He suggested that HMC ships SKEENA and VANCOUVER were already in the Pacific so they should come to the aid of British subjects in El Salvador because of their proximity. Their proposed destination was the coastal town of Acajutla. It was a strategic place to land because the British-owned railway terminated there. Haggard then signalled SKEENA and VANCOUVER before SKEENA gave an affirmative and went on stand by.

In December 1931, Canada became an independent nation state as a British dominion, at least on paper. This was due to the acceptance of the Statute of Westminster. The Prime Minister and Walter Hose could have decided to opt out and been within their rights. They responded in the affirmative because the RCN still strongly identified as part of the Imperial fleet. Very few Canadians were in El Salvador at this time, so the motivation for any involvement was to honour the call of the mother country. The Under-Secretary for External Affairs, O.D. Skelton, and Walter Hose approved SKEENA and VANCOUVER being sent to Acajutla before they informed the Prime Minister.

HMCS SKEENA and VANCOUVER were on their winter cruise sailing to Panama for exercises with the Royal Navy in the Caribbean when Commander Victor G. Brodeur of HMCS SKEENA received the message on January 22 to alter course for the port of Acajutla. Brodeur signalled Ottawa confirming SKEENA and VANCOUVER’s new destination.

When he arrived in Acajutla, Brodeur’s orders included contacting British authorities to determine what could be done to protect British subjects and property in El Salvador if the need arose. American authorities were included in the process. Walter Hose urged a cautious approach and avoidance of overt action unless it was necessary to save British lives. He also wished to be kept informed.

Depending on how the situation evolved, SKEENA’s crew made preparations for the possibility of sending an armed landing party ashore. The Gunner’s Mates of both ships assembled the number one platoon,opened the small arms lockers, and two Lewis machine gun sections on SKEENA in preparation for a possible landing.Then they awaited further instructions.

Saturday January 23,1932

That day, Executive Officer Lt. Frank Houghton of SKEENA went ashore with two armed ratings to establish contact with the British vice consul, H.B. Towning, and the Salvadoran post commandant. Towning assured Brodeur that there was no unrest in Acajutla but nevertheless five wives of nervous railway officials were taken aboard SKEENA for their safety. Nervous husbands boarded the VANCOUVER. One Signalman went ashore to assure reliable communications.

VANCOUVER proceeded on to the town of La Libertad thirty miles south to calm “local concerns”. Brodeur wrote in his report that apparently the arrival of the RCN ships created a stir amongst the American authorities who, “were more than surprised and a little disappointed to see a British flag first.” Apparently American authorities sent for two of their naval ships to come from Panama.

Towning perhaps briefed Brodeur and his Executive Officer Houghton of political instability in El Salvador. Add economic instability to the equation and the country was a tinder-box waiting to be lit. Brodeur’s recorded observations in the secret report appear to be a combination of information gathering gleaned from key figures and his own astute perceptions. The report covers the dates January 23 to 31, 1932.

When SKEENA and VANCOUVER arrived at Acajutla, telephone lines were cut and being repaired. Railway lines were similarly damaged but useable again. Railway communications were functional but suffered damage too. Brodeur spoke with British Charge d’Affaires David J. Rodgers in San Salvador by the railway telephone line that day. Rodgers requested a show of force by the newly arrived “British” warships. Towning advised caution. Brodeur chose caution and refused Rodgers’ request. Brodeur’s decision was in line with Hose’s directive.

Brodeur saw that the Salvadoran government feared the Army might revolt rather than provide an effective defence against the uprising. Army troops were kept in the capital to potentially counter a “serious attack that was expected at any moment.” The Salvadoran government felt Army officers and the National Guard were dependable if there was an uprising.

Sunday January 24, 1932

Brodeur proceeded to San Salvador to assess the situation there at the request of the Charge d’Affaires, Rodgers. The inside story that is not cited in other sources, only the secret report, is that Rodgers did not have the “calm co-operation from his staff and his assistants and specially the General Manager of the British Railway.” Apparently messages sent to Brodeur purportedly from Rodgers were in fact from the General Manager sometimes. That deception created unnecessary confusion for Brodeur.

While Brodeur travelled by car on the railway tracks to San Salvador with Houghton, Petty Officer Ted Priske, and SKEENA’s Gunner’s Mate, Rodgers consulted with the American authorities alone about what to do. Rodgers could get no assurances from the Salvadoran President guaranteeing the safety of British lives and property. Rodgers signalled for the RCN’s platoon to land in Acajutla and to march on San Salvador. Lieutenant Horatio Nelson Lay agreed to land his platoon at Acajutla. They were promptly turned back by a Salvadoran official with a wave of the hand. VANCOUVER got the same signal at La Union but Lieutenant Commander C.F. Hart waited for Brodeur’s orders. Rodgers was instructed that no landing was to take place. SKEENA’s platoon returned to the ship.

Events take a bizarre turn as Rodgers repeats his request that a landing party be sent immediately. Yet again a landing at Acajutla was attempted but Towning met them and advised the party that they could not march on San Salvador because the Salvadoran government had not granted them permission. Lieutenant Ken Adams, in charge of the landing party, grew impatient with the authorities involved and their apparent lack of decisiveness. He wanted to march into the jungle to San Salvador. Adams, Towning and the Salvadoran post commandant began to argue. The post commandant insisted that no foreign force could come ashore. In the end, the landing party remained on the pier awaiting further instructions from Brodeur.

When Brodeur and Rodgers met with the President and got assurance of the safety of British subjects, the landing party retreated to SKEENA as ordered by Brodeur. Apparently the President thought that the armed party bolstered his position. Brodeur does not comment further on this statement but it seems odd, as the landing party was there to protect British citizens, not the government. The President sent his troops out of Acajutla as a result of the presence of the landing party. The interview with the President concluded on amicable terms though he was offended because Brodeur did not meet with him first, rather with Mr. Rodgers. Brodeur thought this, “strengthened the hand of the Charge d’Affaires.”

Brodeur decided to stay in San Salvador that night because he wished to verify rumours of an attack on the capital being imminent; also the railway lines were damaged and it was considered unsafe to travel on them at night. It was possible to maintain telephone communication with the ships. Brodeur also noted that he kept the Lewis gun that came ashore with him under his personal protection so that it could not be seized and used as an offensive weapon. There was overnight firing of rifles nearby but no apparent casualties.

Monday January 25, 1932

On the way back to the ship, Brodeur and Houghton stopped at a large American coffee plantation about 8 miles from Acajutla, and spoke with the manager, Mr. Maryat. Brodeur took a number of photographs of the plantation to show that “it can be seen everything is very normal”. They were there to see if the rumours of an attack were true. What they found dispelled any rumours. On Sunday, a group of plantation workers surrounded Mr. Maryat and demanded their pay. Maryat explained that he could not pay them as the banks were not open on Sunday. The workers then asked for a reduction in hours and more pay and it was granted them. The matter was not ended however, as they then repeated demands for their pay. Maryat then decided to leave for Acajutla. The foreman assured Brodeur that most of the workers returned and that there were no more disturbances.

Tuesday January 26, 1932

Brodeur met with the Charge d’Affaires and Rodgers “appeared decidedly more calm” but he was still running interference from other British officials.

His second meeting was with a British plantation owner, Mr. Lynn, who was part-owner of the largest British plantation in El Salvador. It was located nine miles to the east of San Salvador. He related tales of attacks and other rumours. The following description of the plantation might explain why:

“This is where I observed the unsanitary conditions under which the Indians were working, surrounded with flies and dirty water and were paid very low wages. Here again it was found that on one or two occasions a few Indians were seen in the bushes but they did no damage whatever though it would have been the easiest thing in the world to destroy the plantation due to its isolated location.”

There were other disturbances, such as rebels attacking a customs house and killing a few policemen in an attempt to obtain arms and ammunition. Their attempt failed and government troops arrived to make sure no further such actions were taken.

Travelling back to Acajutla at night by car, it was observed that there were many dead bodies by the side of the railway lines, especially around Sonsonate. Those who were outside carried white flags to show that they were not communist but this was not a reliable way to avoid being shot, as one dead body was observed holding a white flag. It is on this day that Brodeur and his party began to see first-hand evidence of what quelling an insurrection by Government troops looks like.

Friday January 29, 1932

Brodeur received a visit from two army generals in Acajutla who in his estimation dropped by to show how much they were doing to protect British lives and property. He politely received them and the generals clarified with their staff that Brodeur was to be under their protection at all times while ashore.

He accepted the invitation on behalf of the government to go to Sonsonate on Saturday. This region was the centre of the rebellion and by touring this region the generals wanted to show the Canadians how the rebellion was crushed. The luncheon was “very delicious and abundant”. This contrasts sharply with what plantation workers were provided with as food. The vehicle the party travelled up the mountain in was full of armed officers and volunteers. Brodeur had two generals flanking him in the back seat of the car. The general of Sonsonate walked in front of Brodeur anywhere they went on foot.

There is one enigmatic statement that is full of irony, “General Calderon and Chatore were very well educated men with a great sense of humour and very interesting to talk to, and they seemed to consider all lives, including their own, as of little importance.” That realization must have been jarring but not wholly unexpected.

The party then proceeds on a tour by car of the Sonsonate area in the district of Isaloo where much fighting happened. City Halls were consistently destroyed and also the homes of rich plantation owners who were no longer resident, having already fled. One residence left intact was that of Francisio Alfard-Duran noted for his generous treatment of his plantation workers. The destruction appears targeted towards those who were perceived guilty of unjust treatment of their labourers. Residences on either side of Alfard-Duran were destroyed along with their contents including fine furniture, antiques and paintings. Any religious imagery was left intact, as were churches. Based on the preservation of religious buildings and art, Brodeur concludes “that the insurrection, though of a bloody nature, was not communistic.”

Many rebels were shot after a short interrogation consisting of the question, “Are you a Communist?” Brodeur and his officers met five captured Native Salvadoran rebels about to be executed. Brodeur took a photograph of them, bearing witness to their plight but judiciously declined the invitation to witness the execution.

He had seen enough to say, “From observation it is very doubtful if the Indians who took part in the revolution knew what Bolshevism meant. To them it means an organization to release them from slavery.”

Sunday January 31, 1932

Brodeur travelled to San Salvador for a final interview with the Charge d’ Affaires and Rodgers claimed the country was more settled. Brodeur did see new bodies by the rail lines, however. His conclusion of his report states, “my personal opinion is that the revolution was entirely due to lack of consideration for the Indians. There are only two classes in Salvador i.e. the very rich and the Indians. The very rich are the very few and it is noticeable that these few left the country the minute the trouble started.”

In El Salvador, what started as a revolution and became a massacre of coffee workers is referred to as la matanza or the massacre by Salvadorans.

Note: Salvadorans of indigenous Native American origin are known as Cōzcatlān or Hispanicized as Cuzcatlán. Cuscatleco are people of Salvadoran heritage. In the 1932 report they are erroneously called Indians, which was the norm then.

Rear Admiral Victor G. Brodeur’s thirty seven year career in the RCN spanned its formative years. In 1909 Brodeur became one of seven cadets aboard CGS Canada.They were ready for the establishment of the Canadian Naval service in 1910. Brodeur was the first Canadian naval officer to attend gunnery school in Devonport, England in 1920. He participated in World War I and II. He was present at two coronations. The first, for George V in 1911 and the second in 1937 for George VI. From May 1932 to January 1934 Brodeur served as Commanding Officer of HMCS Naden in Esquimalt. He and his family worked and lived in the Senior Officer’s Residence located at Building 20 Naden, now the museum’s office. The building bore his name as the first location as “The Victor G. Brodeur School” in the 1970s and is now located on Head Street. He was made a Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire in 1943 and a Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath in 1946. He retired that year.

Tatiana Robinson

Curator, CFB Esquimalt Naval & Military Museum