HMCS NIAGARA

In the autumn of 1940, recent events in Europe had created a most grave situation in Great Britain.  The defeat at Dunkirk and the failure of the Allies in Norway seriously threatened the very existence of the United Kingdom.  According to plan, the Germans were now rapidly manning the lengthy Atlantic coasts of Europe, whose air and U-boat bases would soon contribute to the grand design of strangling the British Isles by blockade and invasion.

The struggle to date had seriously depleted the sea forces of Great Britain, yet it was essential to survival that the convoy lanes be kept open and that invasion operations by the Germans be countered by adequate defence forces.  The Admiralty reported that no less than seventy British destroyers were lost or required refitting as a result of these operations.  To help alleviate this situation, fifty over-age American destroyers were delivered into the hands of the Royal Navy.  The transfer of these vessels was made in return for a ninety-nine year lease on various shore bases along the North American coast.  In spite of their age, their technical shortcomings, and the fact that many months were required to bring them into operational usefulness, they went far to remedy the scarcity of destroyer escort vessels.  Of these four-stacker destroyers, seven were handed over to the Royal Canadian Navy:  they were HMC Ships ANNAPOLIS, COLUMBIA, NIAGARA, ST. CLAIR, ST. CROIX, ST. FRANCIS, and later, HAMILTON.  Old as they were, these ships were welcomed at Halifax, for the R.C.N. had already lost the destroyers FRASER and MARGAREE and the corvette building programme had not yet produced the badly needed convoy escort ships.

HMCS NIAGARA arrived at Halifax, 20 September, 1940, as U.S.S. Thatcher.  Built at the Fore River Plant of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Quincy, Massachusetts, Thatcher was laid down 8 June, 1918, as part of the great destroyer building programme of the United States Navy during the Great War.  She was launched 31 August, 1918, and completed 14 January, 1919.  Particulars of this class of ship were as follows:

Length:310 feet

Beam:30 feet, 11 inches

Draught full load:9 feet, 8 inches

Armament:Four 4” 50 calibre guns;

and two 3” 23 calibre A.A.;

or two 1 pdr. A.A.

12 21-inch torpedo tubes

in four-triple deck mountings

Designed S.H.P.:27000:35 knots

Twin-screw

Four Yarrow Boilers

Oil Fuel

Complement:139.

The Canadian “Town” Class destroyers spent the first ten days of October 1940 working up at Shelburne and on their return to Halifax were taken in hand for certain alterations and additions.  NIAGARA, ST. CLAIR, and ST. CROIX were completed by 18 November and preparations were made to sail them for service in United Kingdom waters.

Encountering heavy weather, passage was made to St. John’s, Newfoundland, in three days, arriving 3 December, 1940.  The crossing of the North Atlantic commenced the next day, the three ships headed by Captain (D) in ST. CROIX clearing St. John’s at 1100.  Storms dogged the little flotilla from the time that Newfoundland disappeared astern.  Mechanical failures developed one after another and soon the forecastles were heavily iced.  Sometimes hove to and sometimes barely making five knots, fuel consumption became an ever-present anxiety.  By 7 December, NIAGARA was alone, the ships having become separated by the heavy seas.  In addition, ship-to-ship wireless-telegraphy was impossible because of the frequency of the sets and all messages had to be routed through shore stations.  However, NIAGARA rendezvoused with ST. CLAIR off Ailsa Craig and secured to an oiler off Greenock, Scotland, 11 December.  With all his tribulations, the Commanding Officer reported: “HMCS NIAGARA proved herself to be a very good sea boat and stood up very well to the exceptionally large seas in the Atlantic and was very dry.  She rolled heavily all the way over, maximum roll 53°, which put the sea boat in the water but fortunately did not flood her”.  Passage was made to Plymouth by 19 December, 1940, for refit in H.M. Dockyard.  Unknown to the two destroyers, the Senior Officer in ST. CROIX had been forced to return to St. John’s shortly after becoming separated in the Western Atlantic.

HMC Ships COLUMBIA and ST. FRANCIS arrived in United Kingdom waters at the end of January 1941 and by late March all four “Town” Class destroyers were attached to the 4^th Escort Group of the Clyde Force.

On 6 April, 1941, while escorting a westward-bound convoy (OB-306) which had been attacked by enemy aircraft early in the day, NIAGARA obtained a contact ninety miles north-west of the Butt of Lewis.  The Canadian corvette TRILLIUM joined and confirmed the contact.  Hydrophone effect substantiated the evidence that a U-boat was present.  NIAGARA made a counter-attack, followed by a deliberate attack, dropping eight charges.  As the starboard rail jammed all charges had to be fired from the port rail.  Since contact was not regained after these attacks, they were not considered to have been successful; but the U-boat was driven away from the convoy.  NIAGARA was criticized on three counts for her method of attack:  according to C.in-C. Western Approaches, the jamming of the starboard rail was caused by inefficient drill and not to material failure; the depth-charge settings were considered to have been set too deep; and, the radio-telephone silence should have been broken when contact had been confirmed, this to bring in more surface ships to conduct a proper search.

Convoy OB-306 was also attacked from the air on 6 April, north-west of the Butt of Lewis.  A single aircraft scored a bomb-hit on a merchant ship and made off before the escorts could bring their guns to bear.  The next craft that flew over was friendly but this time the ships were prepared and it was engaged by the guns of WINDFLOWER and ST. CLAIR.  A second German aircraft bombed the convoy and escaped unscathed.

This unhappy record of events continued into May.  In the early evening of the 9^th, NIAGARA and ST. CLAIR, escorting a homeward-bound Gibraltar convoy (HG-60) made confirming contacts north-west of Bloody Foreland, Ireland, (54° 48’N:  13° 58’W).  In the course of the ensuing attack definite evidence was afforded of the presence of a U-boat.  NIAGARA reported a white wake at right angles to the ship’s course which was considered to have been caused by the propellers of a U-boat close to the surface.  An object resembling a periscope was sighted by several of ST. CLAIR’s crew.  NIAGARA and ST. CLAIR made nineteen attacks, operating some two thousand yards apart.  This exhausted the supply of depth-charges.  Contact was lost next morning and although oil patches were seen the verdict of C.-in-C. Western Approaches on the outcome was “Doubtful”.  Commodore (D) referring to this and similar performances by the 4^th Escort Flotilla, complained that newly commissioned ships tended to attack every unconfirmed contact until their depth-charges were exhausted.  These faulty tactics, he said, caused large gaps in the escort screen.  The solution, he reported, was to be found in more and more group anti-submarine exercises.

The ”Town” Class destroyers were a serious disappointment to Commander (D) of the 4^th Escort Flotilla under whom they operated, because of recurring defects.  On one occasion the four ships were required for an exercise off Loch Foyle.  None of them actually took part.  ST. CLAIR did not even reach Loch Foyle, NIAGARA reached the harbour but was unable to sail owing to defects.  ST. FRANCIS sailed but was forced to return to port.  COLUMBIA’s endurance was reduced because one fuel oil tank was out of action.

On 28 May, 1941, HMCS NIAGARA received orders to sail for St. John’s where the new Newfoundland Escort Force was to be organized.  When Commodore L. W. Murray, Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Force arrived at St. John’s 13 June, the ships of his command already in harbour were:  OTTAWA, Ramsey, ST. CLAIR, ORILLIA, COLUMBIA, RESTIGOUCHE, Candytuft, NIAGARA, SAGUENAY, and COBALT.  Next day, NIAGARA sailed to join convoy HX-132.

For several months NIAGARA was to give valuable service in the trying conditions under which the Mid-Ocean Escort Forces worked.  In late August 1941 NIAGARA had a small part in one of the more remarkable incidents of the war at sea – the surrender of a U-boat to an aircraft.  At 0830/27 August an RAF Hudson sighted a surfaced U-boat some 80 miles south of Iceland in 62° 15’ N: 18° 35’ W.  Unaware that she had been seen, the submarine – U-570 – dived.  Smoke markers were dropped and a sighting report sent off.  Another Hudson relieved the first and again U-570 was sighted, this time as she surfaced.  Four well-placed depth-charges, though doing no lethal damage, forced the U-boat’s crew to panic and crowd the conning-tower and upper deck.  Convinced that all was lost Lieutenant-Commander Hans Rahmlow ordered his men to don life preservers and a white flag was displayed.  Relief aircraft kept the U-boat under constant surveillance with flares all night until two Royal Navy trawlers and HMCS NIAGARA arrived on the scene next day.  NIAGARA with nearly half her complement ashore in Iceland had raced out and was able to take the submarine’s crew on board as prisoners.  U-570 was towed to Iceland, was later commissioned as HMS Graph, and gave excellent technical service in the Royal Navy.  She was later credited with the probable destruction of a U-boat in the Bay of Biscay, 21 October, 1942.

On 10 September, 1941, HMS Candytuft’s after boiler blew up doing considerable damage to the ship and seriously injuring many of her crew.  HMCS BITTERSWEET, with a United Kingdom-bound convoy, went to her assistance and NIAGARA was sailed from St. John’s.  NIAGARA closed Candytuft in tow by BITTERSWEET the next day and placed a medical party on board.  By this quick action many lives were saved and the two vessels were safely escorted into St. John’s on 14 September.

The second week of the new year provided a sequence of events that was typical for the “Town” Class destroyers in the early years of the war in the North Atlantic.  At 1200Z/8/1/42 NIAGARA and five corvettes were about to depart from Iceland when the destroyer developed a leaking boiler tube and the corvettes proceeded alone to rendezvous with convoy ON-54.  NIAGARA sailed next day and almost immediately heavy head seas were encountered.  By 2300Z/9, the ship was barely making headway at revolutions for seven knots.  NIAGARA was then hove to for nearly three days to ride out the gale.  At 1750Z on the 11^th, USS Wolsey was sighted escorting an east-bound convoy.  NIAGARA on request, took over the convoy as Wolsey was short of fuel.  Within a half hour a storm of hurricane force scattered the convoy and NIAGARA running before the wind was again alone.  The storm-battered M/V Triton was sighted and NIAGARA escorted her safely into the North Channel for Belfast, NIAGARA reaching Greenock 14 January, 1942.

It was a few weeks after this that NIAGARA’s Commanding Officer became involved in what might be called a “tempest in a teapot”.  The exchange of messages is self-explanatory:

C. in C. Western Approaches to Flag Officer Newfoundland Force.

It has been reported to me that HMCS NIAGARA left Convoy ON-66 contrary to direct orders Senior Officer.  On joining convoy daylight 15^th February she stated she was remaining 2 days but after a series of most improper signals with Senior Officer (Commanding RNR in HMS Anemone) she proceeded at 1125A.

…Suggest fuel remaining on arrival should be investigated and copy of HMCS NIAGARA’s signal log for 15^th February be obtained with view to possible court martial.  0440Z/5/3/42.

FONF to COAC

NIAGARA arrived St. John’s 1232/20 February with twenty-two tons fuel remaining.  I consider this would have been insufficient margin had bad weather been encountered and am surprised that C. in C. WA believed NIAGARA could possibly be employed on west-bound trans-ocean escort work in winter time.  Para 2.  Signals disclosed by NIAGARA’s Signal Log were respectful though firm and were based on NIAGARA’s belief he was Senior Officer vide N.E.F. order which reads quote: In the absence of orders to the contrary the senior destroyer in an escort group is always to assume the duties of Senior Officer of that group irrespective of the rank or seniority of the Commanding Officer of any corvette. unquote.  Para 3.  Consider NIAGARA acted in good faith, that decision to proceed was correct, and that failing further evidence no blame should be attached to Acting Lieut. Commander Ryan.  1909Z/6/3/42.

NSHQ to COAC (R) FONF, C in C WA, Admiralty.

In view of all circumstances, it is not considered blame should be attached to ex Commanding Officer of NIAGARA and disciplinary action is not to be taken.

1959Z/16/3/42.

Back at St. John’s, on 5 March, 1942, NIAGARA was ordered to proceed to Halifax with HMC Ships THE PAS, LUNENBURG, and CHEDABUCTO in company.  Cape Race was rounded in single line abreast, 2½ miles apart, and course was set at 240° to skirt the ice-fields of Cabot Strait; on the 6^th NIAGARA received COAC’s message ordering the group to investigate an aircraft’s submarine sighting report, the location of the sighting being 100 miles distant.  NIAGARA proceeded at 20 knots, the remainder to follow at best speed.  When the three ships arrived NIAGARA organized an intensive search.  Two radar contacts were made but star-shell illumination revealed nothing.  The weather closed in and by morning a Force 9 gale was blowing from the south-west.  The ships hove to and became scattered.  In the afternoon NIAGARA began slow progress toward Halifax.

At 2037 that night (7 March 1942) COAC ordered NIAGARA to proceed to Sable Island where the ship Independence Hall was ashore.  The destroyer was unable to alter course in that direction until 0800/8.  The wreck was sighted at 1030 and shortly afterwards CHEDABUCTO arrived.  Both ships lowered their sea-boats, there being some twenty seamen visible on the deck of the merchantman.  The whalers navigated the breakers successfully but were swept past the wreck by the fury of the sea.  Meanwhile HMS Witch was in a position to recover the Canadian whalers and along with her own sea-boat despatched them again to the wreck.  In a masterful display of seamanship, 38 survivors were rescued from Independence Hall.

NIAGARA again played the role of rescue ship in April.  Having escorted SS Rangitiki from Halifax to Bermuda, the destroyer sailed from Bermuda 13 April, 1942, as escort to SS LADY RODNEY for the return voyage.  At 1242Z on the 14^th, eight men were rescued from a lifeboat, survivors from the Norwegian tanker Kollsbegg torpedoed eight days previously by an Italian submarine.  Some five hours later another life-boat was sighted, this time carrying twelve survivors from the British cargo ship Rio Blanco.  These men had been drifting for fourteen days.  Both vessels had been attacked in toward the American coast but the Gulf Stream carried the life-boats further and further out into the Atlantic.

After so many months in the rigorous service of the Newfoundland Escort Force, NIAGARA required a refit that took the whole summer of 1942.  By September the destroyer was employed on the Boston run and on the 4^th of the month was Senior Officer of the escort for Convoy BX-63 (Boston to Halifax) having in company WOODSTOCK, KENOGAMI, PRESCOTT, HMS Georgetown, and USN Blimp K-4.  At 2147Z/4, when some sixty miles off Portland, Maine, Blimp K-4 reported: “Have periscope in sight”.  NIAGARA and WOODSTOCK at once proceeded to the spot where the Blimp’s marker was floating and carried out a search.  Although the Blimp’s crew were absolutely certain that a periscope had been sighted, no contact could be confirmed by Asdic.  Depth-charges were fired as a precautionary measure, but NIAGARA suspected the presence of whales.

HMCS NIAGARA was employed during 1943 in the Western Local Escort Force, engaged primarily on the northern section, that is the escorting of trans-atlantic convoys between HOMP (Halifax Ocean Meeting Place) and WESTOMP (Western Ocean Meeting Place), east of Newfoundland.  There were no untoward incidents during this period, part of which was taken up by an extensive refit.  From 2 March, 1944, until the end of the war, NIAGARA was based on Halifax as Torpedo Firing Ship for the training of Torpedo Branch personnel.

On 24 August, 1945, the destroyer was recommended for disposal and on 2 September sailed to Sydney for destoring.  Paid off to date 15 September, NIAGARA was declared surplus to Naval requirements 25 February, 1946.  At Sydney, N.S., the ship was turned over to War Assets Corporation, 27 May, 1946.  On condition that she be broken up for scrap, HMCS NIAGARA was sold to International Iron and Metal Co., Ltd, of Hamilton, Ontario, 15 August, 1946.